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The Original Meaning of Brown: Seattle,
Segregation and the Rewriting of History
For Michael Lee and Dukwon
D. MARVIN JONESt
In two historic instances Negro Americans have been benefi-
ciaries-as well as victims-of the national compulsion to level or to
blur distinctions. The first leveling ended the legal status of slavery,
the second the legal system of segregation. Both abolitions left the
beneficiaries still suffering under handicaps inflicted by the system
abolished.'
I. INTRODUCTION: BROWN AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
Abraham Lincoln prophetically captured the spirit of reconstruc-
tion,2 "As I would not be a slave, so I would not be master. This
expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the
extent of the difference, is not a democracy." 3 In this worldview free-
dom, democracy, and equality between citizens are indissolubly linked.
The reconstruction amendments were a crystallization of this linkage. As
Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
It [the thirteenth amendment] not only struck down the institution of
slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the
imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of
slavery .... It decreed universal civil freedom in this country.... it
was followed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which .. .declare[ed]
that "all persons born ... in the United States ... are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside" ..... These two
amendments, if enforced ... will protect all the civil rights that per-
tain to freedom and citizenship.4
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law
I. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 219-220 (2002) (1955)
2. Reconstruction is the period of American history following the Civil War in which
Congress enacted a panoply of civil rights protections on behalf of blacks (including the 13th,
14th and 15th Amendments). Eric Foner dates this period from 1867 (when "Radical
Republicans" in Congress "swept away southern governments and fastened black suffrage upon
the defeated south") to 1877 the date of the Hayes-Tilden Compromise. In exchange for favorable
resolution of a dispute over the presidency the Republicans agreed to remove the northern troops
which had enforced civil rights laws. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, at xix (1988).
3. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 427 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001)
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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These reconstruction amendments represented, in many ways, a
new constitution. The infamous compromise, by which the Constitution
of 1789 condoned slavery although never mentioning it by name, was
the enabling premise of the union. This was also America's original sin.
By rejecting the illicit original "deal" the reconstruction amendments
were both redemptive and revolutionary. But reconstruction would begin
a tragic pattern: Congress proposed but the Supreme Court disposed.
As a practical matter the project of reconstruction was scuttled
when, to settle a disputed election, northern troops were removed from
the South in the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877. Reconstruction-
i.e., the project of achieving equal citizenship for blacks-ended, really,
when the last union soldier left. It ended formally with the decision in
Plessy.
Plessy infamously held that the state sponsored segregation of
blacks and whites on Louisiana Railroad cars was constitutional. Plessy
illustrates how the politics of race and the politics of constitutional inter-
pretation become entangled. While the fourteenth amendment guaran-
teed citizenship it did not define its meaning. Plessy divided the rights of
citizenship between the social and the political.5
The object of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in
the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either.6
On the basis of this ingenious parsing of citizenship, which conveniently
found harmony with the prejudices of whites in southern states, Plessy
ushered in the era of segregation. If equality was America's dream, seg-
regation was its "nightmare."7 Plessy's framework was used to justify a
system of interlocking laws and customs in which blacks were relegated
to "second-class citizenship." It was so vast and so pervasive that
W.E.B. Du Bois said, "[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the
problem of the color line."'8 Gunnar Myrdal famously identified the sig-
nificance of this color line as the American dilemma.9 It was "the ever-
5. Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDoZo L. REV.
1689, 1700 (2005).
6. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544, overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 50: KING'S
DREAM OR PLESSY's NIGHTMARE? 7 (2004).
8. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, at xxiii (Modem Library ed., 1996) (1953).
9. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1944). Another author's interpretation is helpful here. "The wide gap between rather
high levels of white support for ideals and lower levels of white approval of governmental action
to implement these ideals has been a persistent feature of contemporary American racial
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raging conflict between ... the valuations preserved on the general
plane which we shall call the 'American Creed,'" and another level at
which "personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jeal-
ousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group
prejudice ...dominate his outlook."' As Mary Dudziak points out,
after World War II this dilemma took on a deep political dimension:
America's pattern of segregation hobbled its efforts to gain influence in
third-world countries."
The significance of Brown 2 was that it formally resolved this
dilemma. It outlawed segregation in education, and it, on paper, brought
the law in harmony with the law's basic ideals. Brown was in many
ways a failure as a constitutional project. But its language and ideals
gave birth to the civil rights era and more specifically to an era of reform
which included the passage of equal opportunity laws. Brown served, for
those it inspired, as a second constitution, a charter for "the second
reconstruction." 13
But while Brown denounced segregation, segregation was not
defined. There are at least two senses in which segregation has been
traditionally understood. At the surface level segregation was a distinc-
tion based on race either authorized or required by law. This is segrega-
tion as a discrete decision or a discrete intentional act. This is clearly
outlawed in Brown. But segregation has effects. For example, as the
Brown court famously noted, segregation caused "the negro children"
who were excluded under the Jim Crow regime to experience "stigmatic
harm".
But which sense did Brown give to "segregation": Was it an evil of
discrete decisions or an evil of its stigmatizing effects? By failing to
explicitly resolve these questions, the Brown Court not only left Brown
itself unclear, but it also failed to resolve the dilemma. Since Brown,
schools have largely resegregated. Blacks in inner cities are increasingly
socially isolated. This social isolation perpetuates past discrimination.
attitudes." Edward G. Carmines & W. Richard Merriman, Jr., The Changing American Dilemma:
Liberal Values and Racial Policies, in PREJUDICE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 237,
238 (Paul M. Sniderman et al. eds.,1993).
10. MYRDAL, supra note 9, at xlvii (emphasis omitted).
11. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61, 62-63
(1988).
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. The "second reconstruction" is synonymous with "the civil rights era." C. Venn
Woodward originates this phrase. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 107
(1993) (The phrase originates with an earlier edition. The book was published first in 1960.); see
also MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION 3 (rev.2d ed. 1991) ("Almost a century
later, a 'Second Reconstruction' occurred. Like the former period, the Second Reconstruction was
a series of massive confrontations concerning the status of African-American and other national
minorities ....").
2009]
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The effect or result of this isolation is often the same sense of stigma
experienced by the children in Brown. At the same time, this result typi-
cally cannot be traced to a specific decision but rather is directly caused
by the operation of institutional and sociological factors. Is this twenty-
first century apartheid prohibited as "segregation" within the meaning of
Brown? Or not?
A. Parents Involved v. Seattle' 4 : The Structure of the Decision
In Parents Involved, the Court consolidated two cases, one from
Seattle, Washington, and one from Jefferson County, Kentucky, raising
the exact same issue: Can a school, without a relevant history of de jure
segregation, classify students by race and then engage in race-conscious
measures to achieve "racial balance" in the schools?
15
In the Seattle case, the school board settled a case brought by the
NAACP by agreeing to a mandatory busing plan. 6 By 1999, this
evolved into a program in which the school district classified all students
by race. They then determined what was an acceptable ratio of black and
white students. When a school was "oversubscribed" by a particular
racial group, the race of competing students, each "qualified" to go to
the school, became a tiebreaker.' 7 In Jefferson County, the school sys-
tem had been under a desegregation order beginning in 1975, but the
order was dissolved in 2001.8 Jefferson County used a "choice plan."
Students were grouped according to a cluster of schools."' Students got
their specific school unless it was overcrowded, or unless their assign-
ment would tip the school into racial imbalance.2 °
Let's start with the doctrinal debate in Parents Involved. We will
soon see that the doctrinal debate is a cover for a disagreement about
competing conceptions of equality. But, in turn we see that the duality of
equality becomes, for the two warring camps within the court, a window
through which they conceptualize the injury to blacks. Thus, the Court
explicitly identifies the meaning of segregation as the ultimate issue.
Each side defines this harm in a diametrically different way. They fail to
resolve the meaning of segregation, because they never get beyond the
text of Brown. Brown can only be understood contextually.
14. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
15. Id. at 2746.
16. Id. at 2803-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 2747.
18. Id. at 2749.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2749-50.
[Vol. 63:629
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1. THE DOCTRINAL DEBATE
The Court frames the debate in terms of two issues; one is what the
level of scrutiny should be. It is hornbook law to say that racial classifi-
cations trigger "strict scrutiny." It follows that once "strict scrutiny"
applies, the legislation in question only survives if the government can
show it has a compelling reason for the racial classification. But the
dissent argues that this "rule" which treats race as an inherently invidi-
ous classification should not be universal.21 Defenders of affirmative
action argue that affirmative action is "a welcome mat rather than a keep
out sign."22 In the same vein, the dissenters argue that what is happening
in this case is a social good, not an evil." The majority and dissent pivot
between two doctrines: a one-size-fits-all concept of equal protection
and one which is multi-layered and contextual. The Roberts Court
rejects this contextualism. Roberts states, "Racial classifications are sus-
pect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention
cannot suffice."24 The second issue is what constitutes a compelling rea-
son. The dissent says, among other things, that addressing social isola-
tion of "black students" is a compelling reason. 5 The majority
disagrees, saying that racial isolation may result from many reasons, but
the Court has authority to intervene only if the imbalance can be traced
to specific, identified discrimination.26 For the dissent, social isolation is
enough because, intentional or not, such isolation itself can lead to stig-
matic harm. For the majority, this is not dispositive. They insist there are
"race neutral" ways to address the problem of imbalance.27 Justice Ken-
nedy stated, "A sense of stigma may already become the fate of those
separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate control. But to
this the replication must be: Even so, measures other than differential
treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be
exhausted."28 In this back-and-forth, the two sides of the Court talk past
each other. They are separated by two different views of the world. At
one level it is a different view of what equality is.
21. Id. at 2798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference between a 'No
Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.").
23. The court stated, "They do not impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone
but instead seek benefits for members of all races alike. The context here is one of racial limits
that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to bring them together." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2818 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2764 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
25. See id. at 2820-2824 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 2755-2759.
27. Id. at 2759-2760.
28. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2009l
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2. THE DUALITIES OF EQUALITY
i. The Individual v. The Social
For the majority, equal protection rights are individual and inaliena-
ble. They speak in a voice that is classically liberal, quintessentially con-
tractarian. For the dissenters, equal protection is a social concept-
equality must be broad enough to address discrimination as a systemic
problem to allow for "social engineering." Like the visionaries in
Brown, they want to march toward an integrationist ideal. As legal real-
ists, the dissenters believe that, to quote Justice Blackmun in Bakke,29
"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There
is no other way."30 The majority, as legal formalists, dismiss this as so
much "social theory."
ii. Intent v. Effects
For the majority, racial imbalance in itself is insignificant. "We
have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegrega-
tion plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that 'the Con-
stitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without
more.' "31 The source of this is what many scholars refer to as the model
of "corrective justice." This model sees discrimination in particularistic
terms, much like a tort.
The violation consists of acts and effects. Under the prevailing inter-
pretation of the Constitution, a defendant "violates" the equal protec-
tion clause only if (1) its own actions, not those of unnamed or
unnamable parties, are (2) racially-based or intentionally discrimina-
tory acts, not simply acts that have an adverse racial effect.32
By "acts," the theory refers to specific decisions. This discriminatory act
or decision defines the scope of the remedy.
The second element of the structure of corrective arguments is a con-
cept of linkage between the remedy and the violation. The defen-
dant's violation is not simply a trigger for judicially-mandated action,
unleashing a freewheeling judicial policy-making power. Rather, the
remedy must be linked to the violation as a corrective, a measure that
seeks to eliminate the violation's harmful effects.33
Also, "'[F]ederal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are
aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or
29. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
30. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
31. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752 (2007)
(quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977)).
32. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLuM. L. REV. 728, 732 (1986).
33. Id.
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does not flow from such a violation.' Courts, in other words, are not free
to provide 'remedies' for conditions that are not caused by a violation of
law."3 4 The conceptual frames of individual rights versus group rights,
intent versus effects, and corrective justice versus the integrationist ideal
are all simply efforts to define the scope of equality. But these philo-
sophical antinomies are so abstract as to be indeterminate. They can be
argued either way, but more importantly, they do not get at the substan-
tive core of what the Court is truly fighting about. What divides the
Roberts Court at bottom is not something abstract, but something con-
crete. It is clear that Brown exists to address a constitutional evil, the
evil of segregation. This was something very real rather than abstract for
all those involved at the time. What segregation was becomes the pivot
for the debate in the Court. Justice Thomas defines the ultimate question
precisely: "Because this Court has authorized and required race-based
remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is important to
define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance."35
This is true because from the standpoint of corrective justice, the scope
of equal protection remedies is as broad as the evil it seeks to address.
This sends us unerringly to the question of how broad or narrow the evil
of segregation is.
Let me emphasize the critical importance of "the meaning of segre-
gation" another way. Constitutional law takes place at several levels at
once. On the surface, there is the level of doctrine. Below that is a dia-
logue about our deepest ideals. These ideals are ultimately defined by
our historical experience, or more exactly, the "historical narrative" we
take from that experience. As Walter Benjamin has written,
[N]o fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became
historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be sepa-
rated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his
point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads
of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has
formed with a definite earlier one.36
Thus, constitutional interpretation is often historical interpretation. The
majority and the dissent seem to agree on the importance of the histori-
cal narrative: Our "break" with segregation defines who we are. It
becomes key to define what constituted the break.
34. Id. at 733.
35. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768-69 (Thomas, J., concurring).
36. WALTER BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS 253, 263
(Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., Schocken Books 1969) (1955).
2009]
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B. Level Three-The Meaning of Segregation
The two sides do address this issue of what segregation is, but only
rhetorically. Thus Justice Roberts writes, "Before Brown, schoolchildren
were told where they could and could not go to school based on the
color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried
the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once
again-even for very different reasons."37  Stevens replies, with
profound eloquence,
The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren
who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of
white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other
ways, The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court's
most important decisions.
38
Neither side definitively resolves the issue of what segregation was
because they confine their arguments about the meaning of Brown to the
text of the case. Both sides in Parents Involved address the question of
what segregation was, but only by appealing to the plain meaning of the
words. This is like trying to determine the meaning of a constitution by
only looking to its "plain meaning." One legal scholar defines formal-
ism 39 as the notion that the text is opaque; We can't see through it to the
context or the policies behind the text.4"
I am reminded of the words of Alasdair Maclntyre, speaking of the
decline of "moral language," that tell a story about a people trying to
reconstruct knowledge after a disaster when all they have are fragments
of books here and there. Imagine an "enlightened people [who] seek to
revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all
that they possess are fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached
from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them signifi-
cance ... ."" Like that "enlightened people" in Maclntyre's story, the
majority seemed to have forgotten the near history of segregation, and
37. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
38. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
39. For a comprehensive understanding of "formalism" as a concept of constitutional
interpretation please see Steven Winter, Chief Justice Roberts Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. Mimin
L. REV. (forthcoming) expounding on the many different senses in which "formalism" may be
used. My work is primarily an interrogation of the Roberts opinion based on the historical record.
Professor Winter's critique delves deeply into the opinion in terms of its failure both as analytical
and moral reasoning.
40. See generally Burt Neuborne, The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm The Reader
Became the Book: Reading the Bill of Rights as a Poem: An Essay in Honor of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2004) (arguing for a
holistic reading of the Bill of Rights, that legal text matters, and discussing methods of
interpreting legal texts).
41. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 1 (1981).
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having forgotten this, impoverish the "moral language" of equal protec-
tion law by speaking in an abstract, textualist way. The purpose of my
article is to look at the context that the Roberts Court obscures.
The first thing to do in expanding this inquiry beyond the text is to
look at the assumptions each side of the Parents Involved decision
brings to the discussion. Then I want to test the assumptions historically
to see which are true and which are false.
Each side of the Roberts Court answers these questions in a way
that constitutes a different "story" about what segregation is, why it is
wrong, and when courts have a warrant to correct the wrong. The dis-
agreements in this story concerning the nature and meaning of segrega-
tion mirror their competing concepts of equal rights.
Dissenters Majority
What is it? A systemic problem A problem of specific identifiable
governmental decisions
Why is it wrong? Carries a stigma Violates principles of colorblindness
Source of stigma Slavery Government classifies based on race
Legal significance Harmful effects: When it is intentional
perpetuates racism
I can show that historical segregation simply cannot be described
the way the Roberts Court describes it. Courts during the time of Brown,
particularly the Supreme Court, operated from a very different para-
digm. More specifically, I can show that between 1954 and 1968, for the
period of what I want to call the second reconstruction, courts took a
"realist" approach toward civil rights issues. The linchpin of that "real-
ism" was an explicit denunciation of segregation as it was: first of all, as
a system rooted in slavery and white supremacy, and, most importantly,
as something harmful because of its effect on "black children." This era
of thinking was swept away by the rise of process theory in the 1970s.
But this paradigm shift must not obscure the fact that for a brief moment
in our legal history courts operated from a more realistic approach.
Was Brown about black children or was Brown about individual
children? It all hinges on how segregation was understood at the time.
II. THE MEANING OF SEGREGATION IN 195442
Then does segregation offend against equality? . . . But if a whole
race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set up
42. "Of any particular thing ask, What is it in itself, and by its constitution?" MARCUS
AURELIUS, MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS TO HIMSELF 96 (Gerald Henry Rendall trans., 1945)
(1902).
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and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station,
and if the question is then solemnly propounded ... I think we ought
to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of
laughter.
4 3
James W. Loewen has stated that segregation was a system of "sec-
ond-class citizenship" for blacks.44 According to Juan Francisco Perea,
segregation was "a system of racial etiquette that keeps the oppressed
group separate from the oppressor when both are doing equal tasks."45
Further, Loewen describes it as "a system of norms that dictated every
aspect of human behavior from how one drove, to whether one shook
hands, to how one person glanced at another."46 Whatever segregation
was, it was not something that could be simplistically reduced to a set of
discrete decisions by wrong-thinking individuals. As W.E.B. Du Bois
wrote, "Race segregation in the United States too often presents itself as
an individual problem; a question of my admission to this church or that
theatre ... In fact, this matter of segregation is a group matter with long
historical roots."47 It was, in other words, systemic. The systemic nature
of segregation is expressed first of all by its universality throughout "the
South." In 1954 all southern states imposed segregation by state law.4 8
43. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
424 (1960).
44. JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES My TEACHER TOLD ME 163 (2d ed. 2007).
45. JUAN FRANCISCO PEREA, MI PROFUNDO AzUL: Why Latinos Have a Right To Sing the
Blues, in "COLORED MEN" AND "HOMBRES AQUI" 92 (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006) (quoting
LOEWEN, supra note 43, at 163).
46. JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES ACROSS AMERICA: WHAT OUR HISTORIC SITES GET WRONG 222
(1999).
47. W.E.B. Du Bols, AN ABC OF COLOR: SELECTIONS CHOSEN BY THE AUTHOR FROM OVER
A HALF CENTURY OF HIS WRITINGS 171 (Int'l Publishers Co. 1970) (1963).
48. As then Harvard professor Arthur E. Sutherland wrote, "'The South' ... includes in it 13
states-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia." Arthur E. Sutherland, Segregation by
Race in Public Schools: Retrospect and Prospect, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169 n.1
(1955). All of these states and several northern states explicitly required segregation. See ALA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 256 (amended 1956); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (amended 1995); FLA. CONST. of
1885, art. XII, §12; KY. CONST. § 187 (amended 1996); LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XII, § 1; Miss.
CONST. art. VIII, § 207 (repealed 1978); Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (amended 1945); N.C. CONST.
art. IX, § 2 (amended 1970); OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (repealed 1966); OKLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 5 (amended 1978); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (repealed 1973); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12
(amended 1978); TEX. CONST. art. VH, § 7 (repealed 1969); VA. CONST. art. IX, § 140 (repealed
1971); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 8 (repealed 1994); ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 167 (1940) (repealed);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 80-509(c) (1931); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-1011 (1951) (repealed 1970); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-1110, 31-1111, 31-1113 (1951) (repealed 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.09
(1953) (repealed 1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-909 (1933) (amended 1961); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 158.020, 158.021, 158.025 (1953) (repealed 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115-2 (1955)
(repealed 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 5-1, 5-5 (1949) (repealed 1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
751 (1952) (repealed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2377 (1932) (repealed); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2900, § 2897-8 (1951) (repealed); W. VA. CODE §§ 1775, 1894 (1949) (repealed).
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The systemic nature of segregation, the fact that it was so pervasive as to
be inescapable, was what made it so pernicious.
Black school children are not injured as much by a school board's
placement of them in a school different from that in which it has
placed white school children, so much as by the reality that the
school exists within a larger system that defines it as the inferior
school and its pupils as inferior persons.49
But in 1954 school segregation was but one department in a vast empire
of social control. After Plessy one newspaper satirized the case as
follows:
If there must be Jim Crow cars on the railroads, there should be Jim
Crow cars on the street railways. Also on all passenger boats .... If
there are to be Jim Crow cars, moreover, there should be Jim Crow
waiting saloons at all stations, and Jim Crow eating houses .... There
should be Jim Crow sections of the jury box, and a separate Jim Crow
dock and witness stand in every court-and a Jim Crow Bible for
colored witnesses to kiss. It would be advisable also to have a Jim
Crow section in county auditors' and treasurers' offices for the
accommodation of colored taxpayers. The two races are dreadfully
mixed in these offices for weeks every year, especially about
Christmas....'o
But, as a historian, no detail was too small. All of the arbitrary racial
distinctions satirized came true. As C. Vann Woodard writes,
The extremes to which caste penalties and separation were carried in
parts of the South could hardly find a counterpart short of the lati-
tudes of India and South Africa. In 1909 Mobile passed a curfew law
applying exclusively to Negroes and requiring them to be off the
streets by 10 p.m. The Oklahoma legislature in 1915 authorized its
Corporation Commission to require telephone companies 'to main-
tain separate booths for white and colored patrons.' North Carolina
and Florida required that textbooks used by the public-school chil-
dren of one race be kept separate from those used by the other, and
the Florida law specified separation even while the books were in
storage .... A New Orleans ordinance segregated white and Negro
prostitutes in separate districts. Ray Stannard Baker found Jim Crow
Bibles for Negro witnesses in Atlanta courts and Jim Crow elevators
for Negro passengers in Atlanta buildings.5
There were not only separate railroad cars but separate water fountains,
49. Joe R. Feagin & Bernice McNair Barnett, Success and Failure: How Systemic Racism
Trumped the Brown v. Board of Education Decision, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1099, 1103-04 (2004)
(quoting Charles Lawrence, "One More River To Cross "-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown:
A Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWV. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 49, 53 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980)).
50. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 68.
51. Id. at 101-02.
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waiting rooms, and ticket windows. Some states "required Negro nurses
for Negro patients. ' 2 During WWII, German prisoners could eat with
white soldiers but black American soldiers could not.5 3 In Bound For
Freedom, Flamming describes the segregation of swimming pools in
California beginning in the 1920s. "In Pasadena, the public pools were
open to colored people one day a week, 'International Day,' after which
the water was drained . . . -"4 Other towns had similar restrictions.
In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal wrote, "Segregation is now becoming so
complete that the white Southerner practically never sees a Negro except
as his servant and in other standardized and formalized caste situa-
tions. '5 5 Segregation was the deliberate division of society into two dis-
tinct worlds.
In those days, black people in their community had all the things that
they had, because they were set aside from the white community, and
we had all the things we needed to sustain us .... We had no affilia-
tion with the whites [in school] whatsoever. Everything was separate
and unequal .... We had aspirations but we were limited since we
were in the black world, that's where we lived .... You thought...
that everything was alright, and we were not looking out onto the
white world because if you ventured out, you were stopped before
you could even get started. And in those days there was just a definite
dividing line of black or white. White over here; black over here....
It was a black and white world. No coming together on anything.56
In many states blacks could not marry whites and vice versa.57
But, with the exception of school segregation, the most pervasive
form of segregation was housing segregation. There were separate parks,
in some cities separate districts, in which blacks could live.58 Segrega-
tion in housing was for many years an actual policy, i.e., the standard
operating procedure, of the federal government.
It is now well-established and indisputable that housing segregation
52. Id. at 99.
53. AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO 246-47 (rev. ed.
1970) (1966).
54. DOUGLAS FLAMMING, BOUND FOR FREEDOM: BLACK Los ANGELES IN JIM CROW
AMERICA 216 (2005).
55. MYRDAL, supra note 9, at 41.
56. Feagin & Barnett, supra note 48, at 1104-05.
57. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) ("The two statutes under which appellants
were convicted and sentences are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting
and punishing interracial marriages.... Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme
[are designed to] automatically void[ ] all marriages between 'a white person and a colored
person' without any judicial proceeding .... ").
58. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 100. "Virginia . . . authorized city councils to divide
territories into segregated districts and to prohibit either race from living in the other's district
.... Id.
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as we know it today remains the result of deliberate and systematic
racist programs and policies of the federal government, assisted in its
institutional racism by the banking, real estate, and insurance indus-
tries. The current patterns of housing segregation began to develop
after the turn of the twentieth century. . . .By the 1930s, through
deliberate and state-sanctioned acts of racial zoning, restrictive cove-
nants, and public works projects, the segregation of blacks in inner
city neighborhoods was becoming the norm.5 9
And "[t]he FHA was operated in a racially discriminatory manner since
its inception in 1937 and set itself up as the 'protector of all white neigh-
borhoods,' using its field agents to 'keep Negroes and other minorities
from buying houses in white neighborhoods."' 6 o The system of housing
segregation was facilitated by a strategy of government-sponsored
"redlining."
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) adopted the practice of
"red-lining," a discriminatory rating system used by FHA to evaluate
the risks associated with loans made to borrowers in specific urban
neighborhoods. The vast majority of the loans went to the two top
categories of the rating system, the highest of which included areas
that were "new, homogenous, and in demand in good times and bad."
The second highest category was comprised of mostly stable areas
that were still desirable. The third category, and the level at which
discriminatory "red-lining" began, consisted of working class neigh-
borhoods near black residences that were "within such a low price or
rent range as to attract an undesirable element." Black areas were
placed in the fourth category.6 '
Of course, to this wall separating a black world and a white world in
education, housing, public accommodations, water fountains, and swim-
ming pools, we must add the voting booth. As Michael Klarman writes,
Though its timing and method varied, the general pattern of black
disenfranchisement was consistent across states. First, whites reduced
black political participation by force and fraud, which they justified
as "necessary to prevent the [South] from falling back into the control
of the inferior race." Then, Democratic legislatures enacted laws,
such as complex voter registration requirements, which further
reduced black voting and Republican representation. This facilitated
state constitutional changes, such as poll taxes and literacy tests,
59. Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and Beyond, 11
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 39 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
60. Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical
Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 89, 93 (1998).
61. Id. at 92.
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which consummated black disenfranchisement.62
According to Congressional records, these practices were so effective
that as late as 1965, just prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act,
blacks were still systematically and deliberately disenfranchised.
These obstacles meant that black registration in Dallas County lagged
substantially behind white registration. Figures from the 1960 census
showed that Dallas County was 57.6 percent black. Its voting age
population was 29,515-14,000 whites and 15,115 blacks. Yet when
the Selma campaign began on January 18, of those 9,877 who were
registered to vote, 9,542 were white and only 335 were black.
Between May 1962 and August 1964, only 8.5 percent (93 of the
795) of blacks who applied to register were enrolled, while during the
same period 77 percent (945 of the 1,232) of applications from whites
were accepted.63
The best description of segregation is that it was a system of racial
caste. Du Bois attempts to capture the interlocking, seeming universal,
and continuous practice of racial exlusion through the metaphor of a
wall.
Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was differ-
ent from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but
shut out from their world by a vast veil .... The shades of the prison-
house closed round about us all: walls strait [sic] and stubborn to the
whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night
who must plod darkly on in resignation, or beat unavailing palms
against the stone, or steadily, half hopelessly, watch the streak of blue
above. 64
A system of racial caste cannot be reduced to something that must be
traced to a discrete individual decision. Said another way, the model of
segregation adopted by the Court is incommensurable with historical
segregation as it actually was. It doesn't fit. It is stunningly ahistorical
and inaccurate. Similarly, a model limited to identifying and punishing
discrete, identifiable violators suffers from the same incommensurablity.
Also, in order for the Warren Court in Brown to deny segregation
as a systemic, social, and historical pattern, the Warren Court had to
adopt a rigid formalistic account of interpretation. This doesn't make
sense because Brown is methodologically anti-formal. Formalism, as we
have said, is a refusal to look past the text. For example, a formal
approach to interpretation would be to find the original intent of the
62. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CivIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 30 (2004).
63. Voting Rights Act of 1965: Essay, CONGRESSLINK, 2006. http://www.congresslink.org/
print-basics-histmats-votingrightsessay.htm.
64. Du Bois, supra note 8, at 4-5.
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Fourteenth Amendment as to the acceptability of segregation. This is the
classic instance of originalism. Brown is famous in part because the
Court boldly rejected originalism as a source of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Looking past the text again, the Court considered sociological evi-
dence in the form of the Brandeis briefs.
Of course the Roberts Court would say it does not matter what
segregation actually was, or how the Warren Court in Brown actually
understood it. What matters is the meaning of equal protection, and
equal protection only reaches intentional acts; barriers, effects are
beyond the normative scope. This certainly has been the mantra of the
conservatives on the Court. But the court seems blissfully unaware that
its current emphasis on intent is a radical break with an earlier tradition.
The intent model is a relatively recent doctrinal innovation. The
intent model of equal protection was not utilized significantly in deseg-
regation cases until 1971. It was not firmly entrenched until 1976. Prior
to that time, the harm of segregation was explicitly, widely conceived of
by courts in objective terms as a barrier or effect. In Brown itself, the
opinion implicitly relies upon an effects model. "In 1954, when Brown
v. Board of Education, finally overturned the rule of 'separate but
equal,' the Court stressed the stigmatic effect segregated schools had on
black children. The Brown opinion cited extensive empirical evidence
for its finding of psychological injury, with no mention of discrimina-
tory intent. 65 In later cases this becomes explicit.66
A. Palmer v. Thompson
Up until 1962, Jackson, Mississippi operated five swimming pools.
"Four of the swimming pools were used by whites only and one by
Negroes only."67 In 1962 the district court for the Southern District of
Mississippi declared that enforced segregation of Jackson, Mississippi
pools was unconstitutional. 68 Rather than integrate the pools, the city
closed them, claiming it was not economically feasible to operate the
65. Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
1299, 1306-07 (1995).
66. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 266-67 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) ("As stated at
the outset of this opinion, by closing the pools solely because of the order to desegregate, the city
is expressing its official view that Negroes are so inferior that they are unfit to share with whites
this particular type of public facility .... But such an official position may not be enforced by
designating certain pools for use by whites and others for the use of Negroes. Closing the pools
without a colorable nondiscriminatory reason was ... an official endorsement of the notion that
Negroes are not equal to whites. ); see also id. at 268 ("Negroes . . . are stigmatized by
official implementation of a policy that the Fourteenth Amendment condemns as illegal.").
67. Id. at 218 (Black, J., majority opinion).
68. Id. at 219; see also Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962).
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pools on an integrated basis. 69 Blacks sued to reopen the pools, arguing
that the decision to close the pools, rather than integrate them, was moti-
vated by racial animus,7 ° which it obviously was. The Supreme Court
denied relief on the ground that, even if true, the city's motive in closing
the pools was irrelevant.
But no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who
voted for it. The pitfalls of such analysis were set forth clearly in the
landmark opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck,
where the Court declined to set aside the Georgia Legislature's sale
of lands on the theory that its members were corruptly motivated in
passing the bill.7 '
The Court does not stop there. It affirmatively states that the harm it is
after in equal protection cases goes to the "effect" of what the govern-
ment has done.
It is true there is language in some of our cases interpreting the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments which may suggest that the motive
or purpose behind a law is relevant to its constitutionality. Griffin v.
County School Board, [377 U.S. 218 (1964)]; Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). But the focus in those cases was on the
actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation which led the
States to behave as they did.72
The Court could hardly have been more clear.
In the same vein, congressional hearings on the problem of discrim-
ination confirm the idea of segregation as a systemic problem, a struc-
tural problem in today's terms. This was the mainstream view.
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex
and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now
generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects"
rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the sub-
ject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of
seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect
of pre-act discriminatory practices through various institutional
devices, and testing and validation requirements. 73
It is only in 1973, in Keyes, 4 that the Court holds that "segregative
intent" was dispositive in a case. 75 But Keyes, while focusing on "segre-
69. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 219 ("The District Court found that the closing was justified ...
because the pools could not be operated economically on an integrated basis.").
70. Id. at 219, 224.
71. Id. at 224 (internal citation omitted).
72. Id. at 225.
73. S. REP. No. 92-415, at 5 (1971).
74. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
75. Id. at 208-09.
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gative intent," arrives at a finding of intent by way of a presumption that
the dissenters argued was result-oriented. 76 It was consistent with a
notion that segregation was a system, and that remedial measures needed
to be "systemic." The intent test was not officially established until
Washington v. Davis77 in 1976. But in Washington, I was struck by the
fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant briefed or talked about
the issue of whether effects could constitute discrimination, without
more. That issue had not yet, in courts, become a frame of analysis or
discussion.
There is a paradigm shift between Palmer and Washington. The
paradigm shift had its roots in a series of articles by John Hart Ely and
Paul Brest, both process theorists, who argued that it was the intent that
mattered. 8
B. What Makes Segregation Wrong
Segregation in the South comes down in apostolic succession from
slavery and the Dred Scott case. The South fought to keep slavery,
and lost. Then it tried the Black Codes, and lost. Then it looked
around for something else and found segregation. The movement for
segregation was an integral part of the movement to maintain and
further "white supremacy" .....
The harm of segregation is social stigma. Brown itself emphasized
that racial segregation of negro children "generates a feeling of inferi-
ority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."8°
The concept of stigma was definitively explored by Erving
Goffman, who traces the origins of the term to the ancient Greeks.
Ancient Greeks originated the term "stigma" to refer to a system of
markings typically burned or cut onto the bodies of criminals, traitors,
and prostitutes as a way of identifying them as people "to be discredited,
scorned, and avoided.'
It is only because of this appreciation of stigma82 that the Court
76. See id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
78. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 130-31 (1971); John Hart Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1228-30 (1970).
79. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
424-25 (1960).
80. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953).
81. Steven L. Neuberg et al., Why People Stigmatize: Toward a Biocultural Framework, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA 31 (Todd F. Heatherton et al. eds., 2003).
82. The Plessy framework of "separate but equal" assumed that while blacks did not have
access to the same facilities, each party was treated with equal dignity. "Laws permitting, and
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overrules Plessy. What is key in this concept of stigma is that it was a
message about blacks. Thus David Strauss explains, "[t]his approach
focuses less on the concrete effects that a government action has on a
group's position and more on the message that the action conveys to
others. Stigma in this sense is related to defamation. 83 Defamation by
its target is the reputation of a person or, if one follows Beauharnais,84
the reputation of a group. Defamation always takes its meaning from
context.
For the Roberts court the stigma-the negative message-flows
entirely from the message the government sends when it classifies an
individual. For the dissenters stigma flows the message segregation
sends about a "negroes" as group. Superficially, there is a tenuous basis
for the Roberts court linkage between stigma and the colorless
individual.
The Warren court stated the harm of segregation is "made worse"
by the sanction of law. This language is, really, the final refuge for a
formalistic reading of Brown. From this the Roberts court infers in effect
that the evil of segregation is in the government decision to classify an
individual along racial lines. It does not matter to the Roberts court that
the individual is black or white. Armed with this universalism the Court
in Seattle, just as in Croson and Adarand, subjects the Seattle school
board's efforts to achieve racial balance to the same level of scrutiny the
court applied to the historic segregation experienced by blacks.85 But
this reduction of the harm of segregation to what it says about colorless
individuals substitutes abstract conceptualism for history.
The stigma of segregation traces to two sources. Both are linked
contextually to the unique historical experience of blacks. The first is the
fact that the dominant racial group imposed segregation on blacks as
powerless minorities. The second source of stigma is the experience of
blacks with slavery.
even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other...." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
544 (1896). Plessy was overruled because the Court recognized the psychological harm that
segregation caused. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
83. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 942 (1989).
84. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
85. Doctrinally this equation of race conscious affirmative action plans with historic
segregation begins with Croson v. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct.
706, 102 L. Ed. 2d. 854 (1988). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995). In Adarand, an O'Connor opinion the court was
explicit as to why they felt the equivalence was true, "a statute of this kind inevitably is perceived
by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less
qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race." 515 U.S. 200 at 229.
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As Douglas writes in 1963, "[A] relic of slavery-an institution
that has cast a long shadow across the land, resulting today in a second-
class citizenship in this area of public accommodations. ' 6 He goes on to
say, "The Black Codes were a substitute for slavery; segregation was a
substitute for the Black Codes . "...87
Slavery and the message of black inferiority are mutually inter-
twined.88 Segregation was rooted in slavery and slavery could only be
rationalized, as Taney's Dred Scott opinion attests, by a story of black
inferiority. 9 Black inferiority in turn is simply the flip side of white
supremacy. The message of segregation was a message of white
supremacy, i.e., that blacks were an inferior order of human life.
The whole thing is unreasonable, unscientific and based upon unadul-
terated prejudice. We see the results of all of this warped thinking in
the poor under-privileged and frightened attitude of so many of the
Negroes in the southern states; and in the sadistic insistence of the
"white supremacists" in declaring that their will must be imposed
irrespective of rights of other citizens. This claim of "white
supremacy", [sic] while fantastic and without foundation, is really
believed by them for we have had repeated declarations from leading
politicians and governors of this state and other states declaring that
"white supremacy" will be endangered by the abolition of
segregation. 90
In the context of Brown, it was not all children who were
threatened by this message, it was black children. This is especially true
because segregation was commonly understood as an extension of slav-
ery, not the property relations, but the hierarchical relations. The harm of
segregation was its implicit marking of blacks as members of a lower
caste linked to slavery. As Justice Breyer noted,
But segregation policies did not simply tell schoolchildren "where
they could and could not go to school based on the color of their
86. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 246 (1964).
87. Id. at 247.
88. D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO.
L.J. 437, 454 (1993). I spend much of my time in this article exploring the porous boundary
between slavery and racial ideology. I have specifically explored Dred Scott as an example of how
racial ideology can capture legal analysis. See also D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX, AND SUSPICION:
THE MYTH OF THE BLACK MALE (2005).
89. In Dred Scott, Taney famously wrote,
They [negroes] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social
or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
90. Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529, 542 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
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skin," (plurality opinion); they perpetuated a caste system rooted in
the institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination. 9'
Breyer makes the point about the objective historical meaning of
segregation. It is important to add, however, that it was precisely this
linkage between segregation and slavery which animated courts in this
period to dismantle it. Slavery is inextricably bound up in both the his-
torical exegesis of segregation as well as its received meaning.
Perhaps the most stunning denunciation of segregation as a mes-
sage of white supremacy occurs in Loving v. Virginia. In Loving, the
Court addressed a Virginia anti-miscegenation statute which prevented
blacks from marrying whites and vice-versa. 92 Today the case is under-
stood in terms of process theory. But at the time, the Court looked at the
case through the lens of the nations experience in World War II, a war
against Nazism and fascism.
The notion of blacks as a separate caste was explicit in the Virginia
judge's rationale for the statute:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red,
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interfer-
ence with his arrangement there would be no cause for such mar-
riages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mix.
9 3
The Court begins its analysis by focusing on the motive or reason
behind the statute. "[T]he state court concluded that the State's legiti-
mate purposes were 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and
to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' [and] 'a mongrel breed of citi-
zens'... ."' The Court notes that this was obviously an endorsement of
the doctrine of White Supremacy.
95
While most scholars try to understand Loving as resting on a notion
of privacy, many scholars understand Loving as a case that flows from
how it read the message of segregation. Virginia's anti-miscegenation
law represented a message of white supremacy which was unacceptable.
Brown and Loving can be read in the same way. "Brown held that segre-
gated schools were unconstitutional primarily because of the message
segregation conveys-the message that Black children are an untoucha-
ble caste, unfit to be educated with white children."96 Loving's denunci-
ation of the message of white supremacy follows an arc tracing back to
91. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2836 (2007)
(internal citation omitted) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955)).
95. Id.
96. MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLP
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Brown's denunciation of the message of "negro inferiority." Both of
these cases hearken back to Strauder v. West Virginia.97
The point is this: The Supreme Court in Loving and elsewhere
explicitly traces the stigma of segregation to an historical linkage
between blacks and slavery. This message is conveyed through practices
of exclusion imposed without the consent of blacks themselves. This
intertwining of slavery and powerlessness is unique to blacks.
When the Seattle school board decided to exclude whites from its
program it was an example of the dominant group deciding to disadvan-
tage itself. Inasmuch as these were the elected representatives of all of
Seattle residents, this was, in the context of democracy, with the consent
of the governed. Also, Joshua, the white child who challenged the school
assignment policy of Jefferson County in Parents Involved, is not a
member of a group which experienced slavery. Finally, while the exclu-
sion was intentional, injury to Joshua was not. Any unfairness is a sec-
ondary feature, something unintended and incidental to a program
designed to promote a social good. Historically segregation was
designed deliberately and primarily to enforce the supremacy of whites.
There is no comparison, no symmetry. For blacks, the Roberts
Court opinion operates as erasure: It erases their historical experience in
favor of an artificial, abstract ahistorical formalism. For the Warren
Court it operates as appropriation. It appropriates the deeply historicized
"moral vocabulary" the Warren Court had developed to denounce the
evil of "segregation." Then it uses the same language, out of its legal
historical context, to mean the opposite of what the Warren Court-the
Court that decided Brown-would have meant.
III. POST-BROWN THEORY
"[7]he work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the
dream shall never die."
98
The Roberts Court canonizes the formal holding of Brown: In the
field of education, segregation has no place. The Roberts Court resound-
WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 59 (1993).
97. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) ("The very fact that colored people
are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the
law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully
qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and
a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.").
98. Senator Ted Kennedy, quoting Tennyson, made this statement at the 2008 Democratic
Convention. See Michael Powell, For Some, Echoes of a Distant Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2008.
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ingly affirms that. But segregation is defined in a peculiar way. Segrega-
tion is something that occurs whenever the government classifies
"children" on the basis of race. Governments may not openly classify on
the basis of race, now not even for the purpose of achieving racial bal-
ance. It follows that having defined the cause so narrowly we can
declare a victory. Segregation as we confronted it in 1954 is a thing of
the past. We have broken with the dark history of racism. We have
achieved "equal opportunity under law." For the Roberts court that is the
true meaning of Brown.
But what is the meaning of Brown today to the black children of
urban areas? The segregation that Linda Brown experienced has been
replaced with the resegregation of inner-city schools. Today 2.4 million
children go to schools that are 99-100% students of color. 99 The social
isolation is most severe in the urban centers of the Northeast. In Boston
in 1992, half of the black students in the region attended schools with
fewer than 10% whites, and one in three went to schools that are 99% or
more minority.100 As of 2001, seventy percent of black students attended
schools where nearly two-thirds of students were black and Hispanic.1"1
It is drastically worse in the inner city. In Miami, many of the same
schools which were segregated in the 1950s are still over 90% black.
10 2
This gross statistical disparity vastly understates the intensity of
segregation experienced by black children, because it does not take
classroom segregation into account. The magnet school program, in the-
ory a program to help foster integration, is frequently itself segregated,
and while the school building may be integrated the impact of largely
white magnet school programs perpetuate the historic problem. Consider
R.R. Moton elementary school in Perrine.
The building was desegregated-52% black, 38% white, and 10%
Hispanic-but "in regular classrooms outside of the magnet program,
75% of the fifth- and sixth-graders [we]re black, and 95% of the kin-
dergartners [we]re black." Most of the minority students at Moton
experienced segregation in their classrooms. In a computer theme
partial-magnet in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, only the 500 students par-
ticipating in the magnet portion of school enjoy an integrated educa-
tion while the rest of the students (the nonmagnet student body,
which is predominantly minority) attend segregated classes. Simi-
larly, at Enloe High School, a partial-site magnet school in Raleigh,
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North Carolina, there is simply an "absolute lack of integrated
classrooms."103
Nonetheless the Miami-Dade school system was declared desegregated
in 2001."°4 The highest levels of social isolation occur in the Northeast.
In 2000, according to the Education Trust, New York school districts
with the highest concentration of white students received $2,034
more per student in state and local funding than those with the high-
est concentration of minorities-a difference of more than $50,000
per classroom.'05
This socioeconomic disparity was portrayed in a recent television
documentary. In "Hard times at Douglass High," the head of the English
Department stated that when a reading test was given to three or four
hundred ninth-grade students, only three or four passed at grade level,
the vast majority were at least three grade levels behind. During the
standardized Maryland testing only 10% of the students passed English,
and 1% passed algebra. Even worse, at Douglass the drop out rate runs
at 50% in the ninth grade. Part of the problem is that as principal, Isabel
Grant states in the film, the teaching staff is two-thirds non-certified
while many substitutes are unqualified for the subjects that they teach.
But the most moving portrait of the plight of black children in the
nation's resegregated schools takes place in the series "The Wire."1 6
Two of the most memorable characters were Michael Lee and Dukwon.
Michael Lee's mother is a crack addict; Dukwon is essentially homeless
but still tries to go to school. These characters eloquently articulate
through their circumstances why schools like Douglass High are failing.
As schools resegregate, poverty is concentrated, and in so doing,
problems are concentrated, like those of Dukwon and Michael.
IV. CAUSES OF RESEGREGATION
There are many causes of resegregation of inner-city schools. These
"causes" are scarcely distinct from the causes of the social isolation of
urban blacks. The creeping apartheid in our schools is related to the
"American Apartheid" 107 of housing segregation and the related problem
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that the economic infrastructure of the inner city has collapsed."°8
A. White Flight
"Residential segregation is the 'structural linchpin' of the nation's
racial inequality."' °9 In a famous song by a sixties singing group called
the Temptations, Dennis Edwards sings, "People movin' out, people
movin' in. Why? Because of the color of their skin." While conserva-
tives attribute the concentration of blacks in inner-city schools largely to
private choices people make about where to live, Sheryll Cashin, in her
book, The Failures of Integration, suggests that Dennis Edwards' untu-
tored observation may be sociologically correct.' 0 She has presented
evidence that "whites place a premium" on living in neighborhoods that
are "all-white."'" Personal preference may indeed play a strong role.
But a variety of factors-from "steering," to vast income disparity, to
the hostility of some communities to people who are different-combine
in the causal chain. Private choice exists within a vortex of institutional
forces which strongly continue an inertia toward "separatism."
B. Black Flight
Between 1970 and 1995, seven million blacks moved to the sub-
urbs-more than during the "great migration" of blacks from the South
to the North." 2 Urban blacks today are a result of suburbanization of
both whites and middle-class blacks in a condition Douglas Massey calls
"hypersegregated."' 13 The term "hypersegregation" refers to a "deep
wall of isolation and concentrated poverty. Poor black people are highly
segregated from all other groups, and their levels of segregation
remained essentially the same in the last third of the twentieth
century." 1 4
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C. "Integration Fatigue"' 15
Whites, like Joshua's parents, overtly challenge all coercive gov-
ernmental measures to achieve integration on moral as well as legal
grounds. Middle-class blacks, from their physical and moral distance in
the suburbs, simply have little interest in the issues of inner-city schools.
The socioeconomic distance between middle-class blacks and the black
urban underclass reflects a cultural chasm. In addition, middle-class
blacks widely view inner-city blacks in stereotypical terms such as lazy,
crime-prone, and ignorant. Bill Cosby's famous tirade captures the
essence of the black middle class's frustration with a cruel distance from
those still trapped in the postindustrial ghetto. To white resistance, black
middle-class apathy must be added to the mainstream sociological atti-
tude: Somewhere between Moynihan's critique of the black family as
dysfunctional and the mainstream sociological evaluation of the under-
class in terms of "cultural pathology," the integrationist ideal has been
lost. We have achieved integration for those blacks who are deserving,
and those in the inner city are simply "the undeserving poor." All of
these arguments in my view are mere rationalizations for failing to face
the problem of "structural racism." We rationalize because we are just
too tired.
D. The Supreme Court Decisions from 1988 to the Present
By far the most important reason resegregation is taking place
because the Supreme Court has enabled it. As Gary Orfield and
Chungmei Lee write,
[D]esegregation of black students continued to increase in the South
until the late 1980s, possibly reflecting the gradual decline in residen-
tial segregation levels. Then, beginning in the 1990s, segregation
began to increase in spite of evidence from the 2000 Census of fur-
ther declines in residential segregation during this decade. This
resegregation is linked to the impact of three Supreme Court deci-
sions between 1991 and 1995 limiting school desegregation and
authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools ...
E. Where Do We Go From Here
Brown failed as a framework for social change through the courts.
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It was successful as a catalyst for political change through the civil
rights movement that followed. Brown gave birth to the Civil Rights
Era. The fact that it has been effectively overruled marks the end of that
era. Derrick Bell aptly refers to this as the end of the second reconstruc-
tion." '7 Ironically while the Civil Rights Era is clearly over, in the pos-
tindustrial ghetto things are worse not better.
We have noted that this tragic social reversal reflects a paradigm
shift in the courts. Scholars of color need to make a paradigm shift as
well. Our scholarly agenda is based on the answer to three questions:
Who do we speak to? How do we believe change takes place? Where do
we go from here? In the past, our answers to these questions seem to
generally have proceeded from the following assumption: Change comes
from the top down-the audience was the Court or at least the goal is,
typically, to influence the Court's decisions. We should address our
writings to the Court or to the profession or to legislative bodies to influ-
ence national policy at the highest level. This deconstructs to a top-down
theory of change.
Civil rights victories are permanent-in a sense, we seem to pre-
suppose that the era of 1954-1988 was a break with history, that the era
of segregation ended and the era of formal equal opportunity began. The
notion seems to be that formal equal opportunity is assured and that we
need to translate formal equal opportunity into "real equal opportunity."
If we disagree with mainstream scholars we view this as disagreement
within a larger consensus.
America has made great progress-the trajectory of narrative
points toward a narrative of racial transcendence. Conservative scholars
sometimes add a narrative of "black deviance." This is the notion that
groups who remain socially isolated remain so due to their poor choices.
These themes and narratives form the core of much of the scholar-
ship that precedes this article. It is well intentioned. I feel that at many
levels I have marched in step with the cadences of these narratives. But
all these narratives are themes that are rooted in a story about Brown,
and its redemption of America from its historic dilemma. But as a
Supreme Court Justice himself has intimated, Brown has been quietly
overruled. Not explicitly, but in the way, we have rewritten its meaning.
In the aftermath of the demise of Brown we can no longer write the same
articles, or advance the themes listed above. To claim racial transcen-
dence in any form is merely a species of denial, or worse, complicity.
We need a new realism, racial realism in Derrick Bell's terms. We need
to begin with the assumption that the Warren Court is no longer sitting
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and that the business we can get done before the Court is limited in ways
that have never been so starkly clear.
Perhaps we need to shift from integration to simply trying to
improve the quality of inner-city schools; from affirmative action to
finding ways to develop the economic infrastructure of urban areas;
from trying to address our arguments to the Supreme Court or the pro-
fession to addressing our arguments to a broader audience.
Whatever our post-Brown theoretic becomes it must be grounded in
a realistic theory of change. Brown was merely a spark to a revolution
culminating in civil rights acts and, erstwhile, affirmative action pro-
grams. It was a spark that ignited the kindling of a coalition of blacks,
northern liberals, and intellectuals who brought about change through
the public space of discourse and the political space of demonstrations,
hearings, and legislation at many different levels. We need to determine
how to recreate that coalition. I dream wistfully that our work be the
spark of a new revolution of social justice: for the children of the post-
Brown era.
Whatever the theoretics of this postreform period are, there is one
fixed star. Segregation did not end. So we must continue the struggle to
end it. We must do so not only to save the "hearts and minds" of
Michael Lee and Dukwon. In the words of Dr. King:
[H]istory has proven that social systems have a great last-minute
breathing power and the guardians of the status quo are always on
hand with their oxygen tents to keep the old order alive. So my
friends, segregation is still a fact. But we know this evening as we
assemble here that if democracy is to live segregation must die.' 18
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